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court20 and remind the witnesses of the responsibility and seriousness
of giving testimoiiy.
21
The court points out that, if the trial court erroneously excludes
the public, the trial will be reversed without any showing of prejudice.
Prejudice is presumed because the right has been violated.
22
The right to public trial, as guaranteed by the Kentucky consti-
tution,23 has not been reviewed recently by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals. 24 The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that infants under
the age of sixteen may be excluded in salacious cases-5 and that
witnesses not on the stand may be excluded by a motion from either
the defendant or the Commonwealth.
26
When a case concerning the right to public trial comes before the
Court of Appeals, this writer recommends that the liberal viev of
Schmit be adopted in salacious cases and a fortiori in cases of a less
sensitive nature. The function of the criminal trial court is to try the
case at hand, not to protect the public morals by exclusions. Any ex-
clusion that is necessary to prevent interference with, or obstruction
of, the due administration of justice and the orderly conduct of the
courts should be allowed.27 However, the right to public trial is too
basic and fundamental to the accusatorial system of justice to be
diluted by puritanical courts in the name of public morality and mere
embarrassment of adult witnesses and spectators.
Michael P. Cox
TORTS-CONTuIBUrOR Y NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAw.-Appellant
Goetz purchased a house which he had visited only three times, twice
at night and once when he did not leave his car. On the northern end
20 State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800, see also United States v. Kobli, 172
F.2d 919, 921 (3d Cir. 1949); eople v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 244, 37 Pac.
153, 154 (1894); State v. Haskins, supra note 19.
21 State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800, 807 (Minn. 1966); see also State v.
Haskins, 38 N.J. Super. 250, 255, 118 A.2d 707, 709 (Super. Ct. 1955).
22 State v. Schmit, supra note 21; see also United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d
919 (3d Cir. 1949); United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herald, 246 F. Supp. 363
(N.D.N.Y. 1965); People v. Byrnes, 84 Cal. App. 2d 72, 190 P.2d 290 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1948); State v. Haskins, supra note 21.
23 "In prosecution by indictment or information, [the accused] ... shall have
a speedy public trial." Ky. CONST. § 11. The 1966 proposed constitution makes
no change in § 11.24 Beauchamp v. Cahill, 297 Ky. 505, 180 S.W.2d 423 (1944) (exclusion
because of inabilit yof witness to testify); Tate v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 685,
80 S.W.2d 817 (1935) (exclusion to prevent overcrowding in the courtroom);
Weadling v. Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 587, 137 S.W. 205 (1911) (exclusion to
prevent overcrdwding in the courtroom).
25 Ky. R. Cium. P. 9.50.
2
6 Ky. R. Catni. P. 9.48.2
7 Deboor v. State, 243 Ind. 156, 182 N.E.2d 250 (1962).
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of his lot was a 34.2 foot tower built by a previous owner to hold an
antenna. Along the northern boundary of appellant's lot, six feet below
the top of the tower and 6.9 feet from it, ran an uninsulated 7,200
volt power line maintained by the appellee. The line was carried on
two wires which were darkened in color, thus giving the appearance of
having insulation. There was no warning, however, to indicate the
true character of the wires. On his fourth visit, appellant, seeking to in-
stall his 10 foot television antenna, climbed the tower with his back
to the wires. He stated that he had not seen the wires even though
there was nothing to obstruct his view. When he reached the top of
the tower, a sudden gust of wind blew the antenna against the wires,
and the appellant was injured. The trial court directed a verdict for
the appellee. Held: Affirmed. The trial court's directed verdict could
be sustained on a finding as a matter of law either that the appellee
was not negligent or that the appellant was contributorily negligent.
The majority of the Kentucky Court of Appeals felt that Goetz was
contributorily negligent as a matter of law, concluding that appellant's
failure to use his senses to determine the presence of the power line
was sufficient negligence to prevent recovery. Goetz v. Green River
Rural Elec. Co-op. Corp., 398 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. 1966).
The Court felt that the appellant's contributory negligence was the
only question it needed to consider. However, there seems little doubt
that the question of the electric company's negligence should have
been presented to the jury. The rule in Kentucky is that any probative
evidence of negligence creates a jury question.' Appellee's maintenance
of an uninsulated high voltage line within seven feet of a television
antenna without a warning of the line's danger at least should have
raised an issue of negligence. In addition, there was evidence intro-
duced at the trial to the effect that the electric company had not
inspected the lines for some four years prior to the accident.2 Such
absence of examination is contrary to the inspection requirements of
the National Electrical Safety Code3 as adopted by the Public Service
Commission of Kentucky.4 These factors would seem to preclude a
finding that the appellee's negligence was not a jury question.
Turning to the question of the appellant's contributory negligence,
1 Wathen v. Mackey, 300 Ky. 115, 187 S.W.2d 1000 (1945).
2 Brief for Appellant, p. 6, Goetz v. Green River Rural Elec. Co-op. Corp.,
398 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. 1966).
3 NATIONAL ELECTRICAL SAFETY CODE § 213-A2.
4 Ky. Rv. STAT. § 278.280(2) (1942) provides authority for the Public
Service Commission to "prescribe rules for the performance of any service or
the furnishing of any commodity of the character furnished or supplied by any
utility...." The National Electrical Safetyi Code has been adopted by the Public
Service Commission, 4 Ky. Admin. Reg. Serv., Rule 11(2), p. 45.
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the rule which determines when the defendant is entitled to a directed
verdict by reason of a plaintiff's contributory negligence is well est-
ablished in Kentucky, as elsewhere.5 "[W]here enough uncertainty
can be conjured up to make an issue as to what the reasonable man
would have done, that issue goes to the jury."G A recent Kentucky case
stated the rule as follows: "the question of contributory negligence is
ordinarily one for the jury, and it is only when the proof is such that
reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion, that is, that plaintiff
was negligent, that the question is one of law for the court to
decide."
7
In keeping with this rule, the Court must have felt that the appel-
lant was negligent and that a reasonable mind could draw no other
conclusion. To sustain this view, it would seem necessary to prove two
propositions: (1) that a reasonable man in the appellant's position
would have seen the wires; (2) that a reasonable man, upon seeing
these wires, would have been forcefully alerted to the danger and
would not then have proceeded in the manner in which the appellant
did.
The Court met the first proposition squarely and held that the
appellant should have seen the wires, finding it "hard to understand"8
how Goetz could have failed to see them. As previously stated, the
wires in question were less than seven feet from the tower and six
feet lower than the top of it. There seems to be no good reason why
the appellant failed to see the wires. A claim that concern over climb-
ing the tower and fear of falling made him less observant than normal
would not be an excuse under existing Kentucky law. The Court dis-
missed this argument, saying "mental abstraction which is not due to
danger or one that should have been seen."9 Nothing obstructed
any surrounding circumstances does not excuse inattention to a known
5 PRoss a, ToRTs 430 (3d ed. 1964).
6 Ibid.
7 Winn-Dixie Louisville, Inc. v. Smith, 372 S.V.2d 789, 792 (Ky. 1963).
8398 S.W.2d 712, 713.
9In support of this statement, the Court cites two cases: Farris v. Summerour,
296 S.W.2d 708 (Ky. 1956); Vaughn v. Jones, 257 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1953).
These cases say little to indicate what the Court is talking about. Presumably it
means that inattention which is not the result of some sudden, disturbing cause
will not be excused. See 38 Am. Jun. Negligence § 187 (1941). But see City of
Ludlow v. Stetson, 163 Ky. 327, 173 S.W. 806 (1915). This case and others
compiled therein apply a more reasonable rule with regard to municipal
corporations and defects in the street. They hold that prior knowledge of a defect
in the street does not make the plaintiff contributorily negligent per se, if this
defect causes him to be injured. The rule set down by the Court regarding
mental abstraction is in some respects opposite to this rule. Without a sudden
and disturbing cause in his environment, can a reasonable man never forget or
fail to notice a danger? Consider a person rushing to his home after learning that
a member of his family has become ill. Would this not create a certain degree of
(Continued on next page)
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Goetz's view of the wires, for he admitted that he would have seen the
wires had he looked.10 Under these circumstances, it seems that Goetz
was indeed acting unreasonably in failing to see the wires. "[T]he
law ordinarily charges a person of unimpaired vision with seeing an
object which, if he had used his senses, he, in the nature of things
must have seen.""
Although readily disposing of the issue in the first proposition, the
Court did not do as well with the second proposition. Analysis of the
majority's opinion reveals that they felt the appellant's negligence in
not seeing the wires was conclusive as to the issue of contributory
negligence. There are statements contained in the opinion which would
imply that Goetz did not exercise reasonable care in avoiding the
wire,12 but obviously the Court felt that his failure to see the wires
was the deciding factor.
Negligence in failing to see the wire should hardly bar the appel-
lant's recovery, if sight of the wires would not alert a reasonable man
to danger therein. Goetz's other actions in putting up the antenna
were not inconsistent with those of a reasonable man who in fact saw
the wires. The dissenting judges felt that the lines, darkened as they
were, did not present an appearance of deadliness or extreme hazard
and would not put an ordinarily prudent person on guard. This is a
valid argument. One wonders how many "reasonable men" would
allow the presence of these somewhat innocent looking lines, seven
feet away, to make them forgo installing a television antenna. Even if
the thought of electric lines as ever being "innocent looking" is some-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
"mental abstraction" in the most reasonable of men? For further discussion of
this rule, see note 11 infra.
103 98 S.W.2d 712, 713.
1129 C.J.S. Electricity § 53 (1965). However, before one blindly applies a
rule such as this, it should be recognized "that everything within the range of
perception of a human being does not register on his consciousness. . . .What
does register on the consciousness depends not altogether, but to a substantial
degree, upon what is in his mind at the time and especially upon what he is
looking for on the particular occasion." .DeRosset v. Malone, 34 Tenn. App.
457, 239 S.W.2d 366, 375 (1950). This line of reasoning also goes a long way
toward refuting a strict application of the rule regarding mental abstraction, note
9 supra.
Also inherent in this problem of 1aolding a plaintiff or defendant responsible
for seeing an object in his environment is the danger of supplanting our general
standard of care with specific rules of conduct. The rule regarding mental
abstraction comes very close to doing this. For an excellent discussion of this
problem. see McKinney v. Yelavich, 852 Mich. 687, 90 N.W.2d 883 (1958).
12 The Court states that "the danger inherent in power lines and electric
lines generally needs no elaboration," and quotes from a recent case "that reason-
able care demands that every precaution be taken to avoid contact with an
electric wire." Electric Plant Board of City of Russellville v. Dotson, 304 S.W.2d
779 (Ky. 1957).
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what questionable, surely it could not be said that any attempt to
place an antenna on the tower would be negligent per se.
A prudent man, seeing the wires and carefully installing the an-
tenna, would not be negligent. Consider that there was evidence to
show the antenna did not necessarily come into contact with the wires
as a result of the appellant's failure to see the wires. It is not unreason-
able to believe that the gust of wind which blew Goetz's antenna
against the wires would have had the same effect on a prudent man
who saw the wires. The rule is well established in Kentucky that "to
constitute contributory negligence exempting the defendant from
liability ... contributory negligence should be a proximate and not a
remote cause, efficiently contributing to the injury or damage."' 3 A
reasonable doubt exists as to whether the appellant's negligence in
failing to see the wires was in fact a proximate cause efficiently con-
tributing to his injury because a reasonable man, seeing the wires,
could conceivably have proceeded as the appellant did and suffered
the same fate. This doubt should have required submission of the
question of appellant's contributory negligence to the jury.
Previous Kentucky decisions neither sustain nor reject this decision
because a case of this type must rest on its own facts. Research has
revealed no other case in this jurisdiction which is very similar to the
instant case. The appellant's brief contains several citations to cases
and rules from other jurisdictions' 4 which seem pertinent to the issues
present here, but these were dismissed summarily by the Court as
"alien authorities which are not controlling in view of the domestic
authorities."15 While these "alien authorities" are not controlling,
several of them seem similar to this case and offer an insight as to how
this case should have been decided. Furthermore, there are no
"domestic authorities" which can truly be said to compel the majority's
decision.
Usually, "in actions against a power company for injuries due to
contact, through a held object, with a power wire, whether the
victim was contributorily negligent has generally been held to present
a question for the jury, particularly where it appears that he did not
have knowledge of the specific danger which caused his injury."' 6 Two
of the cases which support this general rule are quite similar to the
13 Travis v. Hay, 352 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 1961).
14These authorities were Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264 (1939);
Layne v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 161 So. 29 (La. 1935); Northern Va.
Power Co. v. Bailey, 194 Va. 464, 73 S.E.2d 425 (1952); Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d
51 (1960).
15 398 S.W.2d 712, 714.
16 Annot., 69 AL.R.2d 51 (1960).
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instant case. In a Pennsylvania case,' 7 the plaintiff's husband was
inserting a twenty-one foot pipe into a well, when the pipe came into
contact with electric wires ten and one-half feet above his head. The
wires were not insulated, but they were blackened by the weather so
as to give the appearance of being insulated. In upholding a verdict
for the plaintiff, the court said: "not possibly could the court have
declared him to have been at fault as a matter of law."18 Likewise a
verdict for the plaintiff was upheld in a Washington case,'9 where the
plaintiff's husband was holding a twenty-five foot television antenna
which came in contact with an overhead wire and electrocuted him.
The court felt that the question of whether the wires should have
been a warning of danger to a reasonably prudent and cautious man
was for the jury to decide.
These two cases represent the better view, inasmuch as there is a
decided preference for allowing the question of contributory negligence
to go to the jury. It should then follow that the dissenting judges were
correct: the appellant's actions would indeed permit a reasonable mind
to reach a conclusion other than that he was contributorily negligent.
While a jury may deny Goetz recovery by reason of contributory
negligence, it is not the Court's job to arrive at a similar finding of
fact. The Court should first decide if any uncertainty as to what a
reasonable man would do exists; if the Court decides that there is
doubt, it should then permit the question to go to the jury. Such
uncertainty seems present in the instant case.
Thomas L. Hindes
CONsTiTuTiONAL LAw--CmiNAL PROCEDuRE-RiGHTr To COUNSEL ON
APPEAL.-Petitioner, who had been represented by appointed counsel
at his trial, requested that the trial court appoint counsel to perfect an
appeal. The record shows no response to this request, and no appeal
was taken. Petitioner then moved to vacate the sentence under Ky.
R. Crim. P. 11.42 [hereinafter referred to as RCr 11.42].' In over-
ruling this motion, the trial court recited that it had previously ap-
pointed two attorneys to make an appeal if they decided one would
be feasible. Petitioner appealed the denial of his motion, which had
alleged substantive error. Held: Reversed. Hammershoy v. Common-
wealth, 398 S.W.2d 883 (Ky. 1966). An indigent's right to assistance
17 Brillhart v. Edison Light & Power Co., 368 Pa. 307, 82 A.2d 44 (1951).
'8 Id. at 311, 82 A.2d at 48.
19 Muck v. Snohomish County Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 41 Wash. 2d 81, 247
P.2d 233 (1952).
1 See note 8, infra, for the text of this rule.
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